We consider the portfolio delegation problem in a world with potentially incomplete contingent claim markets. A principal hires an agent to manage a portfolio. When the agent has limited liability that is, there is a lower bound on the compensation contract, she may h a ve an incentive to take on excessive risk. With complete markets, the precise nature of the risk the agent m a y take o n i s a large short position in the state with lowest probability, and a long position in every other state. Our main result is that, with limited liability and a large number of states, incentive compatibility alone restricts the feasible contract to be either a at one or one with exactly two compensation levels equal to the lower and upper bounds on compensation. We examine the e ectiveness of Value at Risk compensation schemes in this context. An appropriately set VaR scheme can be e ective at controlling the size of the maximum loss su ered by the portfolio. However, in general, we do not expect it to attain the same outcome as the optimal contract.
Introduction
The portfolio delegation problem studies the agency problem that arises when an investor or principal" contracts with a money manager or agent" to invest funds. An important real-world feature of this agency relationship is the limited liability o f the agent: the principal cannot force the agent to share losses on the investment. For example, the agent may be a fund manager or a trader at an investment bank. In the former case, the contract usually has a xed component that represents a lower bound. In the latter, the agent may be red if the portfolio performs poorly, but cannot beforced to share in large losses.
In this paper, we study this principal-agent problem, and characterize the optimal incentive scheme with limited liability. A unique feature of our analysis is that, unlike existing literature on the delegated portfolio management problem e.g., Bhattacharyya and P eiderer, 1985, and Stoughton, 1993, we describe the solution in a contingent claims model. Our main result is that, if the limited liability constraint binds at all and markets are complete, then the optimal contract takes a very special form: the agent gets a at fee and gets a bonus if a large enough return on the investment is obtained. We call this a bang-bang" contract.
The contingent claims model highlights the role of limited liability in encouraging the agent to take on excessive risk. With complete markets, a feasible strategy for the agent is to hold a portfolio that has a large negative p a yo in the lowest probability state, and a positive p a yo in every other state. We show that one implication of this is that, if the lowest probability state has small enough probability, then the only feasible i.e., incentive compatible contracts are close to either the at contract, in which the compensation does not depend at all on the outcome, or the bang-bang one.
One of the main roles played by the principal in our model is that he o ers the agent a chance to gamble. Limited liability for the agent is equivalent to the principal underwriting all losses. It is, therefore, interesting to examine the relationship between our work and recent regulation designed to control excessive risk taking by nancial institutions. Banking regulation now requires banks to report the Value at Risk VaR of their portfolios. 1 This, and related measures of risk, are intended to reduce excessive risk-taking. One reason given for the imposition of such risk measures 1 Value at Risk is de ned in Section 4 below.
is the limited liability of most nancial institutions and money managers.
However, a limit on some risk measure such as VaR is only one feature of a contract, and its implications must be studied in the context of the complete contract, which includes a description of the compensation scheme. As a benchmark, we compare our results to a linear compensation scheme with a VaR limit. We call this a VaR scheme. We show that, if there are only two securities, the two schemes are identical. However, with three or more securities, the VaR scheme is not optimal.
We argue that the contingent claims framework is a natural one in which to study risk-taking behavior by an agent. It highlights the nature of the risks an agent will take under limited liability: large short positions in low probability states to nance long positions in high probability ones. While we do not characterize the optimal contract in the general case, the model points to the strong implications of incentive compatibility when there are a large number of states: the only incentive compatible contracts are essentially at, in the sense that the payment to the agent, when positive, is constant across realized wealth levels. This is consistent, for example, with the at fee contracts often observed in the mutual fund industry.
The contingent claims framework also highlights one of the downsides to nancial innovation. We study the problem in an incomplete markets setting in general, with complete markets as a special case. Financial innovation leads to a greater degree of market completeness. To the extent that this increases the ability of the agent to bet on ner partitions of the state space, it exacerbates the agency problem inherent in portfolio delegation. If the incentive compatibility constraint is binding in the presence of innovation, the contract will have to be continually revised to remain incentive compatible.
Previous work in this area includes Bhattacharyya and P eiderer 1985, Dybvig and Spatt 1986, Grinblatt and Titman 1989 and Stoughton 1993. Bhattacharyya and P eiderer 1985 consider a problem in which agents have di erent t ypes, and are required to invest. They point out that quadratic contracts are incentive compatible in this context, and lead agents to reveal their true information. As with Stoughton below, they restrict attention to exponential utilities and a normal distribution for the risky asset. Dybvig and Spatt 1986 show that risk-sharing is e cient if and only if the investor and manager have similar" preferences.
Stoughton 1993 considers a moral hazard problem in this context. Set , the set of types, to bea singleton. There is one risky and one riskless asset. The agent expends e ort e which leads to a signal, that gives a posterior distribution H over the return of the risky asset. Stoughton considers two cases: contracts that are linear and quadratic in w.
Under linear contracting, the agent chooses x , the weight on the risky asset, since it is not incentive compatible for the agent to simply reveal the signal truthfully and let the principal invest. Since H is assumed known only to the agent, the principal must compute VaR based only on F, the prior distribution. A V aR rule then prohibits certain choices of x .
If the revelation principle is applied, one can think of the principal directly choosing x , after the agent has revealed his signal to the principal. In this setting, a VaR-rule is clearly redundant. Bhattacharyya and P eiderer 1985 show that a quadratic contract is incentive compatible for the agent, and leads to truthful revelation of signal. Stoughton 1993 shows that, as the principal's risk aversion coe cient approaches zero, the portfolio induced by the optimal quadratic contract approaches rst best. Grinblatt and Titman 1989 show that, if there is limited liability, the agent has an incentive to take on a riskier portfolio than otherwise. The solution they propose is that the loss to the agent of underperformance outweigh the gain from overperformance. In our model, this solution is infeasible due to limited liability; instead, we focus on the implications of limited liability for the set of feasible contracts.
Some of the work in this area, including Grinblatt and Titman 1989 under partial equilibrium, Admati and P eiderer 1997, Lynch and Musto 1997 and Das and Sundaram 1998 considers contracts based on a performance benchmark. Dybvig, Farnsworth and Carpenter 2000 show that the optimal contract may involve the use of a benchmark, over and above portfolio performance. In our framework, there is no natural benchmark to use. In any case, even if contracts were conditioned on some benchmark, limited liability restricts the set of feasible contracts. Ou-Yang 1998 considers the optimal contract in a continuous time setting, but with unlimited liability.
Palomino and Prat 1999 also consider a moral hazard problem in this context. They consider a setting in which portfolios are de ned by their mean and risk measure that is unspeci ed, and in which a unique e cient portfolio exists. This appears to rule out the standard mean-variance case of a minimum variance frontier that gives rise to a continuum of e cient portfolios. They characterize the rst-best single period contract in their setting, and show that the rst-best outcome cannot be achieved in two periods.
Our paper shares some common features with Palomino and Prat 1999, most notably the lower bound on the agent's compensation function. However, unlike their paper, we do not presuppose the existence of a risk measure; indeed, such a measure should depend on the preferences of the principal and agent, and should therefore be endogenous to a model. Another point of departure is that there is a unique e cient asset in the setting of Palomino and Prat 1999, whereas our framework allows for a continuum of e cient assets.
The notion of bounds on compensation contracts has been explored in contract theory by, among others, Innes 1990. Innes considers a risk-neutral principal entrepreneur and agents investors, with moral hazard on the part of the principal. In our model, the moral hazard problem relates directly to the agent the party taking the contract, rather than the principal the party designing the contract. Hence, limited liability can lead to the agent taking on excessive risk, a notion absent in Innes' model. Recent work on VaR based portfolio management includes Basak and Shapiro 1999. In a continuous time framework, they nd that a VaR rule leads portfolio managers to be uninsured in the worst states of the world, and insure against intermediate-loss states. This corresponds to our bang-bang solution. In our framework, since every state of the world has positive probability, an appropriately chosen VaR rule can limit the worst outcome. Basak and Shapiro further nd that an expected loss based rule is more e ective at controlling the size of the maximum loss. This will necessarily hold in any context in which the probability in a VaR rule is set higher than that of the lowest probability state. A discussion between desirable properties of various of a risk measure and the degree to which various popular risk measures satisfy these is contained in Artzner, et. al. 1998 .
While moral hazard is certainly present in our model since the agent cannot be forced to choose a particular portfolio, but must be induced to do so, there is no asymmetric information or costly e ort. Jiang 2000 considers a general model which involves both traditional moral hazard costly e ort and the form present in our model, and shows that the optimal contract can involve convex and concave regions. Garcia 2000 , in a setting with CARA preferences and normally distributed asset returns, nds that the optimal contract may bea xed wage. In our setting, with a large number of assets and complete markets, a xed wage contract is the only incentive compatible one. We describe our model in Section 2 below. The importance of limited liability and the bang-bang solution are studied in Section 3. Section 4 compares the optimal contract to a VaR scheme, and is followed by some concluding remarks in Section 5.
Model
A principal hires an agent to manage his investments. Since the agent possesses no superior information or skill, we assume that the principal lacks the time to invest on his own. The agent constructs a portfolio of nancial assets at time 0. There is a nite set of states, S = f1; : : : ; S g, one of which will be revealed at time 1. s represents the probability of state s, so that s 0 for all s, and P S s=1 s = 1 . Let = 1 ; : : : ; S .
There are J securities that can betraded at time 0, where 2 J S. Security j pays o an amount a j s 0 in state s. 2 The J securities are linearly independent, so there are no redundant securities. The S J matrix of security p a yo s is denoted by A, and the price of security j is represented by q j .
A special case of this model, of course, is that of complete markets; that is, J = S. In this case, lack of arbitrage implies a unique set of state prices that can be used to price securities. Further, when markets are complete, we can construct portfolios that are Arrow Debreu securities, where security s pays o 1 unit in state s and 0 in every other state. These securities are priced via the unique state prices vector. To sharpen intuition about the problem, when J = S, w e will assume without loss of generality that the securities are Arrow Debreu securities.
At time 0, the value of the initial portfolio is w 0 . This is interpreted as the amount of money the investor turns over to the agent to manage. We assume that the wealth of the principal is unbounded, so that the portfolio can sustain any nite loss.
The goal of the investor is to maximize his expected utility at time 1. The investor's utility is a function of time 1 wealth alone, and is represented by u. The investor is assumed to berisk-averse, so that u 00 w 0 for all w. Further, u is de ned for all wealth levels in R. 4 2 Disallowing negative p a yo s leads to a cleaner de nition of a short position in a security. 3 If the investor were risk-neutral, her utility-maximizing problem is potentially unbounded. 4 This rules out certain functional forms, such a s uw = w , but does permit the CARA form
The investor chooses a compensation function, I, which is a function of realized wealth alone. That is, the investor does not observe the realized state, and can make compensation contingent only on the realized value of the portfolio, w.
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The manager chooses a portfolio taking this compensation function as given.
The utility function of the manager is denoted by v. The manager is weakly risk averse, with v 00 w 0 for all w. In particular, this permits the risk neutral case.
We assume that the compensation function is bounded below, so that there is a maximum penalty that the principal can impose if the outcome is not satisfactory. Without loss of generality, this lower bound is taken to be 0. Therefore, we have Iw 0 for all w. Further, v0 is normalized to 0, and v 0 0 1. 1 e , w . 5 This is the easiest method of introducing an agency problem, and a need to control risk-taking by the agent, in this context. If either the state or the portfolio were directly observed by the principal, the principal could induce the rst-best outcome. 6 The requirement that Iw 0 is meaningless if v 0 c ! 1 as c ! 0. In such a situation, there would be no limit on the ability to penalize the agent.
Iw 0 for all w 2 ,1; 1 3 Above, 1 is the incentive constraint on the agent, 2 the participation constraint, and 3 the restriction on I, re ecting the limited liability of the agent.
Note that the participation constraint is speci ed in terms of a certain income level from an outside o er, I o . This allows us to examine the e ects of changing v.
The gambles that an agent can make will be de ned in terms of self-nancing portfolios. These are portfolios that cost zero in aggregate, and so are easily replicated to achieve unbounded security positions. For convenience, we compare across selfnancing portfolios for which the Euclidean norm of the payo s is 1.
De nition 1 A self-nancing portfolio is a portfolio x with P J j=1 q j x j = 0 and kAxk = 1 .
Let F be the set of self-nancing portfolios. This set is non-empty for any subset of securities,Ĵ, with jĴj 2. Corresponding to every portfolio f 2 F are a set of states in which the portfolio has a negative payo and a corresponding set in which it has a positive payo . Let S f = fs 2 Sj P j2J a j s f j 0g denote the negative payo states, and let S f = fs 2 Sj P j2J a j s f j 0g denote the positive payo ones.
These sets, of course, are mutually exclusive, with S f S f S. Further, asset prices are assumed to satisfy no arbitrage, so both S f and S f are non-empty.
To build some intuition about our problem, we rst show that the compensation function must be bounded. Given a compensation scheme I, let x I = x I 1 ; : : : ; x I J 0 bethe portfolio chosen by the agent; that is, x I is a solution to Problem A. x I is referred to as the portfolio induced by I.
Proposition 1 If v I is unbounded, then x I is unbounded.
Proofs of all results are relegated to the Appendix Section 6. This proposition makes precise the notion of excessive risk-taking with limited liability. If v I is unbounded, the agent sells short an in nite amount of some securitŷ j, and assumes an in nite long position in another securityj. Limited liability ensures that I s x 0 for all s, and, if v I is unbounded, vI s x ! 1 for some subset of states intuitively, states which the portfolio of securitiesĵ andj has a positive payo .
Since the principal is risk-averse, an unbounded portfolio x I leads to a utility to the principal of negative in nity, s o c a n never beoptimal. Proposition 2 If I is an optimal contract, then x I is bounded.
An immediate consequence of the proposition is that, if v i s u n bounded for example, if the agent is risk neutral, I must be bounded. Conversely, an unbounded I such as a linear, increasing function can be optimal only if v is bounded.
Corollary 2.1 If I is an optimal contract, then i Ix I is bounded. ii x I can be implemented by an equivalent contract bounded above by max s2S Ix I .
Therefore, without loss of generality, w e can restrict attention to compensation schemes that are bounded above.
As is usual in principal-agent models, we assume that, when indi erent over portfolios, the agent c hooses the portfolio most bene cial to the principal. Then, given that I is bounded, the agent picks a bounded portfolio. Note that this assumption is less innocuous here than in many other moral hazard models. In a model where the action set is nite, for example, the principal can often strictly induce the desired action by a slight strengthening of the binding incentive compatibility constraints to strict inequalities. In our model, strict incentives to choose the desired portfolio cannot be achieved without a contract that is decreasing in some range of wealth, as demonstrated in example 1 below.
Example 1
Suppose that J = S = 2 . The states have unequal probability, and the securities are Arrow Debreu securities. Let h;`denote the states with high and low probability, respectively. Consider a non-decreasing salary plus bonus scheme, which can be implemented with one target level,t, and an associated bonusÎ. That is, the agent gets 0 if realized wealth ws satis es ws t , andÎ if ws t. Suppose further thatt w 0 q h +q`, so that it is not feasible to attain wealtht in both states. Then, any portfolio in the following class is utility-maximizing for the agent: choose x h t in the high probability state, and let x`= w 0 ,q h x h q`. In particular, a portfolio with a large long position in security h and a corresponding large short position in security`is utility-maximizing.
Suppose that the principal is highly risk-averse, and, of this set of portfolios, prefers the one with x h =t, rather than x h t . Given the compensation scheme described above, this portfolio is only weakly implementable. A strict incentive to choose x h =t must necessarily involve a compensation scheme that has Iw I t when w t .
Compensation schemes decreasing over some range of wealth are not ruled out by our assumption that the realized compensation is increasing in wealth. Such schemes correspond to penalizing the agent for doing too well. In our framework, there are no arbitrage opportunities. The only way for an agent to earn excessive wealth in one state is by being exposed to an excessive loss in some other state. A penalty for superior performance in our model could correspond to, for example, a costly audit if the return exceeds some threshold. Retirement funds, for example, routinely scrutinize the performance of managers who earn returns above some threshold, on the principle that they must be taking on too much risk.
Any portfolio x that the principal can implement can beimplemented with a target scheme, de ned below.
De nition 2 i A targeted b onus scheme is de ned by a pair t; I 2 R S R S + , with t s t s,1 . The agent receives I k if w 1s = t k for some k, and zero otherwise. ii A step scheme is de ned by a pair t; I 2 R S R S + , with t s t s,1 and I s I s,1 for s = 2 ; : : : ; S . The agent receives zero if w 1s t 1 , I k if w 1s 2 t k ; t k+1 for some k, and I S if w 1s t S .
A targeted bonus scheme, therefore, need not bemonotonic. By de nition, a step scheme is monotonic.
The S income levels I 1 ; : : : ; I S can all be taken to be equal, so that this de nition encompasses the at fee contract. It also includes the null contract e.g. set I s = 0 for all s; since I o 0, the agent will refuse this contract, and a bonus scheme whereby the agent gets a bonus b if a target level t is hit set t 1 = t; I 1 = b, and t s ; I s = t 1 ; I 1 for all s 1. Any portfolio that can be induced by any compensation scheme increasing or not can be induced by an appropriate targeted bonus scheme. If the original compensation scheme is non-decreasing, then the target scheme can, further, be a step scheme.
Proposition 3 Consider any compensation scheme I, and the portfolio induced b y it, x I . The same portfolio is induced by an appropriate targeted b onus scheme, t; I t . Further, if I is non-decreasing in w, then x I can be induced by a step scheme.
We therefore restrict attention to targeted bonus schemes, where both t and I are bounded.
The problem of the principal can now be stated as: The solution x; I to this problem is converted to a targeted bonus scheme t; I t by a suitable permutation of states. The only goal of the permutation is to ensure that t is non-decreasing, that is, to satisfy t s t s,1 for s = 2 ; : : : ; S .
The contract, therefore, is de ned by x; I. Since x must solve the agent's problem, we sometimes refer to I directly as the contract, and to x as the portfolio induced by the contract I.
Role of Limited Liability
Consider any bounded targeted bonus scheme, t; I. Let t and I be the maxima of t and I, respectively. We de ne a limited liability portfolio to be one that achieves zero compensation in states S f for some self-nancing portfolio f, and compensation I in states S f . By replicating a self-nancing portfolio often enough, the agent ensures that w 1s t for all s 2 S f . Conversely, w 1s t 1 for all s 2 S f , so that I s x = 0 for these states.
The limited liability portfolio that maximizes the agent's utility is termed a bang-bang portfolio. This latter portfolio describes the optimal gamble an agent would like t o t a k e, and therefore characterizes an important implication of the limited liability constraint.
De nition 3 i Given a bounded targeted bonus scheme t; I and a wealth level w 0 , a limited liability portfolio is a portfolio x such that a P J j=1 q j x j , w 0 , and b for some self-nancing portfolio f, I s x = 0 for all s 2 S f and I s x = I for all s 2 S f .
ii A bang-bang portfolio is a portfolio x that maximizes the agent's utility, o ver the set of limited liability portfolios.
A limited liability portfolio, therefore, can be formed by c hoosing some portfolio x that satis es the budget constraint with equality, some self-nancing portfolio f, and replicating f often enough to reach the highest target level in states S f and fall below the lowest positive income target level in states S f . The set of limited liability portfolios will therefore vary with the security structure and compensation scheme. The bang-bang portfolio will be the portfolio that results in utility maxfv 1 ; v 2 g.
Clearly, this depends on v.
In the special case of complete markets that is, J = S, the bang-bang portfolio can be characterized more fully. Let S = arg min s2S s be the set of states that have weakly lower probability than all other states, with s denoting a speci c element o f the set. S is clearly non-empty. Let s denote the probability of any single state in S. There is a continuum of bang-bang portfolios. Given any bang-bang portfolio, adding another unit of portfolio f, the underlying self-nancing portfolio, creates a new bang-bang portfolio. Where necessary, w e will assume that, of this set, the agent chooses the portfolio that is best for the principal. We note again that implementation is, obviously, a serious issue in this context.
The bang-bang portfolio describes one of the implications of limited liability.
Given any targeted bonus scheme t; I, the agent has the option of choosing to take an income of zero in states S f , where f is the self-nancing portfolio associated with some bang-bang portfolio x, and obtaining I in states S f . That is, the target in states S f is simply ignored. Incentive compatibility, therefore, must rule out the agent deviating to the bang-bang portfolio. While this does not characterize all implications of incentive compatibility, this intuition itself is strong enough to characterize the optimal contract in some cases.
One such case is if the optimal contract is designed to induce a portfolio that leads to the agent a c hieving an income zero in some set of states that can be reached by a self-nancing portfolio. In this case, the induced portfolio x I must bea bangbang portfolio. The size of the position in state s depends on the target wealth t required to achieve the income I. Since the portfolio actually chosen is assumed to maximize the principal's utility, the size of this position also depends on the portfolio the principal wishes to induce. That is, the risk inherent in the portfolio is controlled through t.
We call the compensation scheme in Proposition 3.3 a bang-bang scheme. If markets are complete, this contract is interpretable as a salary plus bonus contract.
The agent gets a salary of zero in all states. In every state except s, she also gets a bonus I.
With a bang-bang portfolio, the expected utility of the agent is at least as high as S f v I. When S f is close to 1, the agent has a strong incentive to deviate from the induced portfolio to the bang-bang portfolio. In this case, this implication of incentive compatibility that the portfolio suggested by the principal o er higher utility to the agent than a bang-bang portfolio restricts the set of portfolios that the principal can induce.
Given a targeted bonus scheme, let f denote the self-nancing portfolio associated with a bang-bang portfolio,
x. As before, S f denotes the states in which f has a positive p a yo . In other words, as the probability of the lowest probability state becomes small, the lowest positive compensation level hence all compensation levels less than the highest one converges to the highest one.
One implication of Proposition 3.5 is that completing markets can exacerbate the agency problem. Suppose that there are a countably in nite number of states, and the numberof securities is increased. As the numberof securities becomes large, the agent is able to gamble on ner sets of states, sharpening the incentive compatibility constraint. That is, completing markets restricts the set of incentive compatible contracts, and hence adversely a ects risk-sharing between the principal and agent, especially when the latter is the less risk averse party.
As Elul 1995 shows, in an economy with no delegation, adding new securities can fail to be Pareto improving in fact, can reduce all agents welfare if markets are su ciently incomplete. Complete markets, however, imply perfect risk-sharing. However, in an economy with delegated portfolio management, while complete markets do facilitate risk-sharing between principals, they intensify the agency problem.
In a situation with nancial innovation, the contract o ered to the agent may need to be continually revised, if the incentive compatibility constraint is binding. If there is a cost to such revision, or a lag in the process for any reason, nancial innovation which lets the agent beton ner partitions of the state space may lead to incentive compatibility being violated, and the agent taking on excessive risk.
Two incentive compatible schemes of particular interest are the the at scheme and the bang-bang one. The at scheme is de ned by Iw = I for all w, and the bang-bang one by Iw = 0 i f w t and Iw = I if w t.
Hence, if the numberof states and securities is large, all incentive compatible schemes approximate either the at scheme or the bang-bang one. Therefore, in this case, case, limited liability strongly restricts the feasible set of contracts. The choice between a at scheme and a bang-bang one will depend on risk-sharing considerations between the principal and agent.
The problem of multiple optimal portfolios with a bang-bang scheme was discussed at the end of the previous section. Note that it applies just as strongly with the at scheme. When compensation does not depend on the portfolio at all, the principal can weakly implement a n y portfolio. However, since there is no reason for the agent t o c hoose any portfolio over any other one, it is di cult to characterize the principal's portfolio as the outcome we can expect. We can only make the weaker statement, that the agent has no incentive to choose a large short position in any security.
Value at Risk
A general de nition of Value at Risk is provided by Jorion 1997. Let F bethe probability distribution over wealth at time 1, w 1 induced by a speci c portfolio, x. Then, the value of risk VaR of the portfolio, given a probability p, is de ned as a That is, the VaR indicates the maximum amount that the portfolio will lose with probability p. Given p, portfolios with a higher VaR are considered risky. In applied portfolio delegation contexts, the agent is often given a target VaR, L, in addition to a probability p, and is required to ensure that the chosen portfolio, x, satisfy Lp; x L.
In our model, w 1s = P J j=1 a j s x s . Hence, the loss in any state s is just w 0 , P J j=1 a j s x j . To de ne the VaR of a portfolio x, order the states and associated probabilities in increasing order of w 1s that is, in increasing order of wealth at time 1.
Using these ordered states, de ne states as the state for which We abstract away from the enforcement and observability issue in our static setting. The results of this section can therefore be interpreted as a best case scenario for VaR: if VaR were perfectly observed and enforceable, would a VaR rule be as e ective in controlling excessive risk, or lead to similar outcomes, as the optimal contract?
Since a VaR restriction by itself does not help de ne the size of the position taken by the agent in states in which the VaR restriction is irrelevant, we de ne a VaR compensation scheme to include an associated compensation scheme, I r .
De nition 4 A V aR compensation scheme consists of a triple L; p; I r , where L; p i s a V aR restriction and I r is a compensation scheme. De nition 5 Given a compensation scheme I, the agent's problem is potentially unbounded if v I is unbounded.
One example in which the agent's problem is potentially unbounded is when the agent is risk neutral, and I i s u n bounded. This includes, but is not limited to, the case of a linear I. That is, a VaR scheme is e ective if the portfolio chosen by the agent is nite i.e., has a nite position in each security. The scheme is ine ective if the agent takes on an unbounded gamble, which leads to an in nite short position in some state. An ine ective s c heme, therefore, results in an unbounded loss for the principal with positive probability. The requirement that x r satisfy the VaR rule is to prevent vacuous rules that no portfolio can satisfy.
To motivate the rest of this section, we present an example on the e ectiveness of VaR in this setting. Next, suppose that y = 0 :2. Then, every portfolio that costs 6 has a payo of 4 and hence a loss of 2 in state 2. In this case, the VaR rule is ine ective. Consider any portfoliox that satis es the budget constraint, and let x =x + zf 2 , where z 2 R represents the numberof replications of f 2 . Since the agent's problem is potentially unbounded, the agent maximizes utility by letting z ! 1 . This leads to an in nite loss in state 1, but with a probability 0 :2 p . Hence, this portfolio satis es the VaR constraint.
The implication of this example is that, if p is too high, the VaR scheme will be ine ective a t c o n trolling the size of the maximum loss. It is clear that, if p s , the probability of the lowest probability state, such a scheme will result in Lx r L.
However, as the example indicates, depending on the security structure, p can be higher than this and yet bee ective.
Let f = arg min f2F S f , andf = arg max f2F S f . That is, f is the portfolio in the set of self-nancing portfolios that has the smallest probability over states of negative payo . In terms of the utility of the agent, this is the cheapest gamble the agent can take, in the set of self-nancing portfolios. It minimizes the probability of states over which the agent's limited liability constraint is binding. Conversely,f maximizes the probability o ver states with positive p a yo . This is the most rewarding gamble the agent can take. Note that the portfolios f andf need not be the same, but it must bethat S f 1 , Sf.
The portfoliof helps de ne a necessary condition for a VaR scheme to be e ective, and f de nes a su cient condition. Consider a situation in which there are a countably in nite numberof states, and J ! 1 , that is, the setting of Proposition 3.7. A static VaR rule will eventually be in this situation as well. For any nite p, the agent will eventually be able to gamble on losses that have smaller probability. Proposition 9 Consider a xed V aR compensation scheme, L; p; I r . Suppose there are a countably in nite number of states, and the agent's problem is potentially unbounded under I r . As J ! 1 , there exists aĴ such that the VaR scheme is ine ective for J Ĵ. This Proposition provides some insight i n to the intuition behind the Basak and Shapiro 1999 result that, in their framework, VaR rules are completely ine ective at controlling risk-taking behavior by the agent. In their continuous time framework with dynamically complete markets, there is no discrete analog to s or s . However low p is set in a VaR rule, any nite p is too high, since the agent can take on excessive risk with a smaller probability.
The optimal contract, I, induces a maximum loss Lx I . To achieve a maximum loss no higher than this, a VaR scheme requires a tighter su cient condition than in Proposition 4.4. Suppose that S f = fs 1 ; s 2 g, with s 1 s 2 , and P J j=1 a j s 1 f j P J j=1 a j s 2 f j . That is, the self-nancing portfolio f has a smaller payo in state s 1 than s 2 . Then, a V aR restriction L; p with p = S f is su cient to ensure that w 1s 2 w 0 , L, but it is possible that w 1s 1 w 0 , L: the loss in state s 1 may well behigher than L. This is not a violation of the VaR restriction, since this state has probability less than p.
To account for this, letŝ = arg min s s j s 2 S f for some f 2 F. Then,ŝ represents the lowest probability state in which a negative p a yo can be obtained. Hence, an appropriately de ned VaR rule is e ective at controlling the maximum loss of a portfolio. In this setting, with p ŝ, the VaR rule is equivalent to a short sale constraint on all self-nancing portfolios with a negative payo in stateŝ.
However, a V aR scheme with p set too high is completely ine ective. Finally, through an example, we show that a VaR scheme is not a good replacement for an upper bound on compensation unless the number of securities is exactly 2.
Example 4
Suppose markets are complete J = S, and the agent is risk-neutral. Let I be an optimal contract that achieves the bang-bang outcome, with x I s 0 for at least two states s 6 = s. Let ii the VaR scheme leads to the same utility for the principal as the optimal contract I if and only if S = 2 .
That is, the VaR rule L; p can be thought of as equivalent to the optimal contract in terms of utility a c hieved by the principal if and only if S = 2 . However, in this case, it must also be that the portfolio chosen by the agent, x I r , and the realized income of the agent, x r I r , match. That is, I r = I at the two points of interest, x 1 and x 2 . In this case, as argued above, the VaR rule is redundant if I r is incentive compatible. Hence, one interpretation of the use of a VaR scheme in this context is that it is a substitute for the incentive compatibility constraints.
In the setting of Example 4, when faced with a VaR scheme with p = s, the agent's optimal portfolio consists of a short position w 0 , L in security s, and a corresponding long position in the cheapest" of the remaining states that is, the state with lowest s qs . In all other securities, the agent invests zero. By contrast, the bang-bang solution induces the same short position in security s, but an equal long position in every other state. Hence, the overall riskiness of the VaR scheme is higher, even though it leads to the same maximum loss.
Conclusion
We examine the e ects of portfolio delegation with limited liability, i n a two-period contingent claims framework. As has been observed by, among other, Grinblatt and Titman 1989, limited liability provides the agent with an incentive to take on too much risk. The innovation in our paper is that we incorporate this into the incentive compatibility constraints for the principal's problem, and examine the resultant set of incentive compatible contracts.
Limited liability in our model is interpreted simply as a lower bound on the agent's payo . We rst show that, in any solution to the principal's problem, the agent m ust earn at most a nite payo in any state. More generally, this implies that any outcome that can beachieved can beachieved with a bounded contract.
The contingent claims framework enables characterization of the optimal gamble the agent would like to take, in terms of the bang-bang portfolio. We nd that the impact of limited liability o n incentive compatibility depends critically on the set of states in which the agent is exposed to getting his worst outcome. If the probability of this set is low, incentive compatibility i s extremely restrictive. The contract must beclose to a at contract over all states in which the agent does not get this lower bound. In the limiting case, as the probability of this set goes to zero, the contract approaches the at contract over the remaining states. Depending on risk-sharing needs, the optimal contract here may be either the at contract or the bang-bang one.
We nd that a VaR compensation scheme, appropriately set, can bee ective in controlling the maximum exposure of the portfolio chosen by the agent. In a situation of nancial innovation, however, the probability inherent in a VaR scheme may need to becontinually adjusted i.e., lowered. Financial innovation allows an agent to gamble on ner partitions of the state space. This has the dual e ect of sharpening the incentive compatibility constraints i.e., fewer compensation schemes are now incentive compatible and weakening the impact of an existing VaR scheme with a xed p.
While we study the static delegation problem, the results generalize in a straightforward manner to any nite horizon economy. This is easy to see with complete markets, where we can re-interpret the states as time-event pairs. Then, an agent's optimal deviation would beto take on a large short position in the time-event pair with lowest probability, and all our results would follow. The in nite horizon case remains to be studied. x I is optimal for the agent under the targeted bonus scheme t; I t . Next, suppose I is non-decreasing. Then, the above arguments follow through completely for a step scheme, with t; I t as de ned above. Hence, in this case, x I can beinduced by a step scheme.
Proposition 3.2
First, choose any portfoliox using the wealth w 0 . Then, consider a portfolio that has a long position y in states s 6 = s, and x s = , y P s6 =s qs qs 0. The portfolio so de ned is a self-nancing portfolio. Let f denote this portfolio. Now, replicate this portfolio often enough to ensure that I s I for all s 6 = s, and I s = 0. Let n be the number of replications required, where n must be nite, since t; I is bounded.
Consider the portfoliox =x+nf. Then, the expected utility from this portfolio is s v0 + 1 , s v I = 1 , sv I:
Now, every other limited liability portfolio must have I s = 0 for some s. Therefore, the portfoliox yields expected utility at least as high as the utility derived from any other limited liability portfolio.
Proposition 3.3
For some limited liability portfolio f, Ix I s = 0 for all s 2 S f . Now, the agent can replicated f often enough to earn I in states s 2 S f , without a ecting payo s in states s 2 S f or s 2 SnfS f S f g. Hence, x I must bealimited liability portfolio.
However, in the set of limited liability portfolios, the bang-bang portfolios are optimal for the agent. Hence, any limited liability portfolio that is not a bang-bang portfolio is not incentive compatible, and x I must be a bang-bang portfolio. Suppose rst that p 1 , Sf. Consider any portfolio x that satis es the VaR rule L; p, and letx = x + zf, where z 2 R + . Since the agent's problem is potentially unbounded, the agent achieves a higher utility from letting z ! 1 than any from choosing any nite z. But then any portfolio chosen by the agent must involve in nite gain in some states, and in nite losses in others. Hence, the VaR rule is ine ective, proving the only if" part of part i of the Proposition.
Next, consider the if" part. Let x r be the portfolio chosen by the agent.
Suppose the VaR scheme is ine ective. Then, there must exist some self-nancing portfolio f such that x r includes in nite replications of f. Therefore, Probw 0 ,w 1s L S f S f , where the last inequality follows by de nition of f. Now, p S f . Hence, the VaR of x r at the probability level p exceeds L, which is a contradiction. This proves part i. The if" part follows directly from Proposition 4.7: i f a V aR scheme is ine ective, its maximum loss is in nite, necessarily greater than any nite L. 
